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Global connectivity, technological development, information, and psycho-
logical operations as well as other evolving elements present new security 
challenges for NATO, especially in relation to the resilience of society. 
Alongside strengthening collective defence, building resilience through 
civil preparedness and innovation will be a game-changer for the ability to 
withstand any form of aggression in future. In the long-term perspective, it 
will require a swift adaptation to new innovations and technology, as well 
as the readiness and willingness of society to take a part in defending own 
country. State and non-state actors will need to be engaged to maintain and 
enhance the security of Allies. The resilience of the society is becoming 
one of the dominating centres of gravity within the context of modern 
warfare. It is a precondition of credible deterrence and defence posture — a 
complementing aspect to the collective defence. 
Russia’s aggression in Ukraine stimulated discussion of societal elements 
in the overall deterrence and defence planning among Allies. Although the 
concept within NATO is still under development, several conclusions can 
already be drawn about how the Alliance perceives the resilience and what 
impact it may have on the overall NATO’s adaptation process, including 
within the discussion surrounding the formulation of the new Strategic 
Concept. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to analyse what collective 
defence measures have been adopted in recent years and how they relate to 
the overall resilience of the Alliance and willingness of the society to defend 
own country — and those of Allies.
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Renaissance and dynamics of the resilience within NATO
Considering the lessons learned from Russia’s aggression in Ukraine 
since 2014, the issue of the resilience of Alliance became an indispensable 
element. From the Wales Summit in 2014 to the Brussels Summit in 2021, 
the concept of resilience has undergone a transformation. In the declaration 
adopted by the Heads of State and Government in 2014, the concept of 
resilience was described only through the prism of the cyber dimension. 
The Enhanced Cyber  Defence Policy was endorsed. Overall, it contributed to 
the fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks. It recalled that the “fundamental 
cyber defence responsibility of NATO is to defend its own networks, and that 
assistance to Allies should be addressed in accordance with the spirit of 
solidarity, emphasizing the responsibility of Allies to develop the relevant 
capabilities for the protection of national networks”.1
At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, resilience was further emphasized in the 
context of the overall agenda. It was linked not only to the cyber dimension, 
but to the wider debate on societal resilience. In addition to reinforcing 
collective defence and enhancing capabilities, strengthening resilience was 
described as an incremental pillar of adaptation process of the Alliance. 
As stated in the declaration, “[Heads of State and Government] made a 
commitment to continue to enhance resilience and to maintain and further 
develop individual and collective capacity to resist any form of armed 
attack”.2 
The policy adapted at the Warsaw Summit emphasized that resilience 
must be seen first and foremost through the prism of national responsibility — 
as an expression of Article 3. Heads of State and Government in 2016 
reinforced the Resilience Guidelines that were adopted by the ministers 
of defence in 2016 prior to the Summit. Resilience Guidelines set by NATO 
focused “on continuity of government and essential services, security of 
critical civilian infrastructure, and support to military forces with civilian 
means”3. By adopting a new sustainability policy, the Allies acknowledged 
that the security issue was complex and comprehensive, requiring a 
coordinated and unconventional solutions. It also pointed to the need for a 
long-term development and adaptation. To face the challenges of the new 
security environment, Allies need to develop critical civilian capabilities, 
alongside and in support of military capabilities. It also requires intensified 
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and integrated cooperation between entire government and private sector. 
Thus, strengthening whole of government approach. The policy required 
resilience to be seen in the context of NATO’s defence capabilities and 
operational planning. This is a new precondition for strengthening overall 
deterrence and defence posture.
Unlike previous summits, the policy in Brussels Summit in 2021 
envisaged an increasing role for NATO in developing and advancing the 
requirements of resilience. Although the perception of Heads of State and 
Government that resilience is first and foremost a national responsibility 
hasn’t significantly transformed, a number of strengthening elements in 
2021 have been introduced. In the light of the collective commitments set out 
in Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, a number of integrated measures 
have been adopted to strengthen the overall resilience of the Alliance. 
It is important that the principles of resilience are linked to any type of 
contingency — peace, crisis, as well as to conflict. In the Brussels Summit 
it was agreed that “Allies will develop a proposal to establish, assess, 
review, and monitor resilience objectives to guide nationally developed 
resilience goals and implementation plans [and] that it will be up to each 
individual Ally to determine how to establish and meet national resilience 
goals and implementation plans, allowing them to do so in a manner that is 
compatible with respective national competences, structures, processes and 
obligations”4. Thus, the role of the Alliance in the overall supervision of the 
resilience increased. 
In order to fulfil the Alliance’s core tasks and strengthen the credibility 
of the Alliance resilience is essential and of utmost importance. Therefore, 
at the Brussels Summit leaders went further and agreed that resilience 
isn’t just a national responsibility, but also a collective commitment. The 
importance of the resilience in the overall discussion within NATO was 
shown by the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Centre for Resilience that is 
located in Romania. 
To ensure a coherent approach, the Alliance’s role is expected to increase 
in the future. Today, each country still has a different understanding of 
what measures need to be taken and what effect they have on the overall 
sustainability of the Alliance. The creation of guidelines and rules is a step 
in the right direction in the context of the overall adaptation process of the 
Alliance.
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Strengthening (improving) the concept of resilience
According to Sun Tzu, supremacy derives from a conquest without fighting. 
In the book “Art of War”, he stressed the excellence of victorious leaders who 
had won before a battle even started, opposed to the failures of those who 
first went to war, attempting to win thereafter. Thus, power derives from 
the skill to break the enemy’s resilience without firing a single shot. The 
same importance of the resilience could be perceived through the prism 
of deterrence. As very clearly described by the Ministry of Defence of the 
United Kingdom “... deterrence is a general reputation, generated over time 
by a posture (and visible actions) that portrays an image of credibility and 
resilience regarding any hostile intent. This reputation is built by how 
adversaries interpret that posture. It is essential to understand that posture 
is not the same as reputation”5. In practice, deterrence by denial consists of 
resilience and entanglement. It is vital to understand the value of resilience, 
indisputably the less glamorous part of deterrence and one that has long 
been treated as an afterthought6. Despite this neglected position, deterrence 
by resilience can significantly change the attacker’s cost-benefit calculation. 
Successful deterrence is based on resilience. 
Recognising the complexity and importance of the issue of the resilience, 
the Alliance has gone further and set out additional steps to take a whole-
of-government approach to enhancing the resilience of societies. Whole-of-
government approach involving most of the government institutions into 
defence planning is of utmost importance to ensure resilience in various 
dimensions and fields. In this context, the Alliance has adopted “seven 
NATO Baseline Requirements for national resilience, through enhanced 
civil-military cooperation and civil preparedness; closer engagement 
with populations, the private sector, and non-governmental actors; and 
the centres of expertise on resilience established by Allies”7. Especially, 
civil preparedness has been perceived as a central pillar of the whole-of-
government approach. It is a “game changer” for the overall Alliance’s 
deterrence and defence posture. Enhancing civil preparedness will be crucial 
in ensuring the credibility of the posture. NATO’s increased role and shared 
responsibility among Allies will be a important precondition to deliver it. 
Among other critical infrastructure, supply chains, and communication 
information networks, including 5G, are the most common elements found 
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in the Alliance’s debate on resilience. Given the growing activity of Russia 
and China, the ability to meet these challenges is becoming vital to the 
overall deterrence and defence posture of the Alliance. Launching the 
#NATO2030 process, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg pointed 
out that “credible deterrence and defence are central, because “the best 
way to prevent a conflict, is to remove any room for doubt, any room for 
miscalculation about NATO’s readiness, willingness to protect all Allies.”8 
He also underscored that resilience is key and “that resilience  — be it 
infrastructure, telecommunications, 5G or healthcare, access to protective 
equipment — all of that matters for the civilian society, but it actually also 
matters for NATO as a military alliance and our military capabilities.”9 This 
confirms the assumption that, whatever adaptation processes take place, the 
overall resilience of the Alliance is one of the key pillars of the future of the 
Alliance. 
Brussels Summit in 2021 was affected not only by the adaptation 
processes that began at the Wales and Warsaw summits and the increasing 
notion of the importance of technologies, but also by the global pandemic 
and the Alliance’s ability to meet such unprecedented challenges. This has 
added a new dimension to the resilience. The challenges posed by COVID-19 
call for new measures. The compatibility of the civil, environmental, 
health, economic and political spheres with the military takes on an even 
more pronounced hue. Like other organizations, NATO was not prepared to 
face challenges at the beginning of the pandemic. Military exercises were 
abolished, decision-making was interrupted, and coordination between the 
Allies was undermined. Although the Alliance had the ability to find short-
term solutions more rapidly than other organizations, long-term resilience to 
such challenges needs to be strengthened. The need for military involvement 
and integration with the civilian sphere in today’s hybrid warfare will only 
increase. Separating them would be an inappropriate approach, which 
would undermine the Alliance’s resilience to external threats, which may 
be caused by both national ambitions and international disasters. Success 
will be based on NATO’s ability to coordinate and supervise the integration 
of civil and military sectors.
Current challenges require NATO to continue to strengthen its 
resilience. Joint and coordinated action between the Allies will be an 
essential precondition for promoting common sustainability. At the same 
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time, cooperation with partners and international organizations matters. 
First, it provides the best solutions for strengthening resilience. Second, it 
mutually strengthens and enhances overall security in the Euro-Atlantic 
area. In this context, the cooperation with the EU is vital. In a crisis and 
conflict situation, the EU’s role in providing civilian support to military 
operations will be crucial in the context of the success of the joint operation. 
Strengthening the overall resilience of NATO and EU requires enhanced 
cooperation between both organizations in the form of joint civil-military 
exercises and common regulations, as well as information exchange.
Shared threat perception and solidarity  
as preconditions of resilience
Strength and power are elements that Russia respects. To have credible 
deterrence, the Alliance needs to strengthen and to demonstrate its ability 
to use might and power, if that is required. A demonstration of strength, 
which could be expressed both in large-scale exercises and deployment of 
permanent Allied forces, is the best signal to the aggressor that the defence 
of each country, and thus of the Alliance as a whole, is being seriously 
planned, tested and valued. Softening and reducing positions will be 
perceived as a point of weakness that Russia will utilize according to its 
own interests. Therefore, measures adapted since 2014, including in the 
Baltic region, is the (minimum) basis in the current security environment 
on which the Alliance’s common deterrence and defence policy should be 
further strengthened.
Solidarity and the desire to protect the country are two other highly 
valued elements in the administration of Vladimir Putin. According to 
Russia’s General Gerasimov’s doctrine, influencing public sentiment in a 
way that provides a basis for military intervention is one of the main centres 
of gravity of the operation. Accordingly, the strength (or weakness) of states 
depends directly on society’s willingness to protect its country as well as 
Allies, if that is required. 
One of the essential elements of the resilience and solidarity is the common 
understanding of the level and classification of threats. As mentioned in 
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the previous chapters, following Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, several 
decisions were taken at the Wales Summit in 2014 and at the Warsaw 
Summit in 2016, which illustrated the change of consciousness and mindset 
among Allies. Both summits indicated that Allies have “come to” a common 
threat perception where Russia’s aggression in Ukraine creates a long-term 
consequence for the transatlantic security. A common understanding of 
Russia’s ambitions and its revisionist approach in the international arena 
was demonstrated. That was a turning point for the security of the Baltic 
states. Prior to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, several Central and Western 
European Allies were rather interested in normalizing relations with 
Russia, even in the form of civil-military cooperation. From the perspective 
of Baltic states, such an approach was considered as unfavourable and risky, 
based on the national threat assessment. Nevertheless, the Heads of State 
and Government in Wales and Warsaw were able to agree on far-reaching 
measures to strengthen the Alliance’s collective defence and rapid response 
capabilities, as well as the re-enforcing of the central role of transatlantic 
relations in ensuring security, while maintaining a clear and common 
understanding of the threat and challenges the Alliance is facing.
Although there was emerging unity among the Allies at the 2014 and 
2016 summits, in recent years, national interests and perceptions have 
come to the fore again. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and aggressive 
assertiveness expressed in many forms are no longer a unifying threat that 
bring all these actors together. In this regard, Baltic states have a completely 
different perception compared to other Allies  — being very sceptical of 
Russian military activism in the Baltic Sea and other surrounding regions. 
Consequently, resilience in the context of NATO must be seen in the broader 
sense of solidarity and unity among Allies. Although resilience is primarily 
a national responsibility, it is the shared understanding among Allies that 
will determine the extent to which collective defence is corresponding with 
existing challenges. To ensure the willingness and readiness of society to 
be involved in defending itself and its Allies, a common threat perception 
communicated by the political and military leaders is vital.
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Understanding the necessity and willingness  
to defend (not only) own country
The willingness to protect Allies and engage in conflict (if that is the 
case) is an essential deterrent element. There are several ways in which 
the willingness to protect the Allies can be projected, demonstrated 
and analysed. One of the most striking forms of expression, which has 
contributed to the calculation on the aggressor’s side, is the deployment of 
Allied forces in the Baltic states and Poland - enhanced Forward Presence 
(eFP). Within the discussion of the deployment, issue of the willingness to 
defend other Allies became relevant. Overall, it highlighted the challenges 
and lack of unity among Allies, as there are, for instance, still several 
Allies that are not present in any of the eFP battlegroups. It illustrates the 
perception of both political leaders and societies of various Allies that differ 
from one Ally to another.
This doesn’t imply that Article 5 has been challenged. It remains the 
cornerstone of the Alliance deterrence and defence posture. In addition, 
NATO as a whole continues to be supported by the vast majority. Although 
tensions and issues exist among Allies, NATO’s overall support and position 
is rock solid. However, when it comes to the practical steps, opinions of NATO 
and issues related to the Alliance vary widely across the countries. The 
sentiment of the society highlights the challenges of the overall willingness 
to step on the soil of an Ally from the very outset of the conflict or crisis. 
According to the survey made by Pew Research Center, “when asked if their 
country should defend a fellow NATO Ally against a potential attack from 
Russia, a median of 50% across 16 NATO member states say their country 
should not defend an Ally, compared with 38% who say their country should 
defend an Ally against a Russian attack”10. Half of the Allies’ societies are 
against involvement in the conflict with Russia. This type of research only 
stimulates Russia’s appetite to test the Alliance’s unity and solidarity.
According to other survey made by the Institute of Land Warfare, 
significant negative indicators of political will do exist because of following 
reasons:
1. “NATO lacks sufficient key leaders who support the use of force to 
defend the Baltics.
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2. NATO displays evidence of diverging alliance missions, threats, 
interests, perceptions of Russia and domestic interests, all of which 
diminish common understanding of the threat.
3. NATO retains significant strength in the third component — a 
potentially-effective solution  — due to latent military and economic 
power”.11
The (un)willingness to protect Allies poses significant challenges in the 
context of collective defence. First of all, it affects the speed of decision-
making. Aware that there is no consensus among the Allies, Russia will be 
able to exploit the lack of political will. By pursuing covert hybrid warfare, 
Russia may thus deter most of the Allies from engaging in the first phase 
of a conflict or crisis. Second, it may provide an incentive to Russia to 
implement a large-scale Anti Access / Area Denial (A2/AD) scenario. A 
large-scale and unexpected conventional attack could lead to the blockade of 
the Baltic states from the rest of the Alliance. In this case, the reinforcement 
of Allied forces will be crucial. The involvement of the Allies will be based 
on the willingness (support) of societies to protect the Baltic states, which 
have emerged during peacetime. Finally, the public’s willingness to defend 
its Allies is particularly important in the context of new threats: cyber, 
strategic communications (disinformation), energy, etc. In order to meet 
the challenges posed by Russia (as well as China), the Alliance’s common 
resilience and the Allies’ willingness to improve each other is of utmost 
importance.
Conclusions
Strengthening deterrence and resilience is a permanent task. The Baltic 
region borders with an actor who exploits the opponent’s weaknesses in 
its own interests. To deter such an adversary, the Alliance must continue 
to strengthen its capabilities, ensure an enhanced and integrated Allied 
force presence, and send signals that any form of aggression will provoke 
a broad and rapid collective response. The credibility of the messaging will 
be determined by society’s desire to protect more than just its own country. 
The willingness to protect the Alliance is, therefore, a cornerstone of the 
deterrence and defence posture. 
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From NATO’s perspective, it is premature to predict that resilience in near 
or mid-term future will become, first and foremost, NATO’s responsibility. 
Member States are expected strengthen their resilience internal and 
external shocks, thus, overall enhancing the Alliance’s ability to adapt to 
new challenges. In this context, Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty is a 
complementary element to Article 5. By strengthening national resilience, 
NATO’s collective defence is enhanced. If each member state individually 
and the Alliance as a whole is resilient to external attacks, this makes the 
Alliance stronger as a whole. In this context, it is important to identify the 
innovative areas and niche skills that each member state can contribute to 
a common NATO capability pot. It must be rather a complementary than 
competitive process. In this regard, NATO as unifying framework will 
be crucial to set the agenda and specific requirements when it comes to 
ensuring resilient society. 
However, in recent years, differences among Allies in their threat 
perception as well as their willingness to defend other Allies have intensified. 
The ability to adapt to uncertain and ever-changing international security 
environment has been a precondition for NATO’s success and development, 
and so will be the issue of resilience and willingness to engage. Since the 
founding of NATO in 1949, the Alliance has experienced several internal 
and external shocks that have eventually affected NATO’s future existence. 
NATO has been able to adapt and find solutions to the challenges it faces. 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a wake-up call that highlighted 
gaps and weaknesses in the Alliance’s perception, approach, and action. 
It also illustrated the importance of willingness, readiness, and ability of 
the society to take part in defence against any form of the attack. Without 
increased willingness to defend whole Alliance the adaptation process of the 
deterrence and defence posture is useless. Allied leaders and the Alliance 
as a whole need to find ways to raise awareness of the society that could 
stimulate the overall willingness to engage, if that is necessary. Otherwise, 
it creates an additional appetite for the adversary to test the unity and 
solidarity of the Alliance.
28
ENDNOTES
1 NATO, Wales Summit Declaration, October 7, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/offi-
cial_texts_112964.htm.
2 NATO, Warsaw Summit Communiqué, July 9, 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_
texts_133169.htm.
3 NATO, Commitment to enhance resilience, July 8, 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/offi-
cial_texts_133180.htm.
4 NATO, Brussels Summit Communiqué, June 14, 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
news_185000.htm.
5 Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom, Joint Doctrine Note 1/19 Deterrence: the Defence 
Contribution, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/860499/20190204-doctrine_uk_deterrence_jdn_1_19.pdf, 23.
6 Lawrence Freedman, The Future of War: A History. New York: PublicAffairs (2017), 67.
7 NATO, Strengthened Resilience Commitment. Jun 15. 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
official_texts_185340.htm.
8 NATO, Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on launching #NATO 2030 — Strength-
ening the Alliance in an increasingly competitive world, June 8, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/opinions_176197.htm.
9 NATO, Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on launching #NATO 2030 — Strength-
ening the Alliance in an increasingly competitive world, June 8, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/opinions_176197.htm.
10 Pew Research Center, NATO Seen Favorably Across Member States, February 9, 2020, https://
www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/02/09/nato-seen-favorably-across-member-states/.
11 Zachary Morris, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Dubious Political Will to Defend Baltic 
Allies, The Institute of Land Warfare, https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/publications/
LWP-120-The-North-Atlantic-Treaty-Organization-Dubious-Political-Will-To-Defend-Baltic-Al-
lies.pdf, 20—21.
